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The Redemption of History: 
A Reading of  
Geoffrey Hill’s A Treatise of Civil Power 
 
Geoffrey Hill practises a kind of aesthetic austerity of style in A Treatise 
of Civil Power (2005/2007) that in the end must be reckoned a part of its 
meaning, its vision of the body politic, power, and culture.1 Three 
elements combine in this respect: difficulty (so called), the constraining 
or tamping down of the lyric voice, and subject-matter. In relation to Hill  
“difficulty” is a hoary trope, and should not be exaggerated here. A good 
number of the thirty-one poems present only a modest level of difficulty 
to the patient reader; however, others, such as “On Reading Milton and 
the English Revolution” and “A Précis or Memorandum of Civil Power,” 
are challenging, and their challenge, a deliberate recalcitrance to easy-
                                                          
1 A Treatise of Civil Power exists in three versions: (1) the original limited-edition 
pamphlet, Clutag Press, Thame (2005); (2) the version published by Yale University 
Press in the US and Penguin in the UK (2007); and the version quoted here, in Geoffrey 
Hill, Broken Hierarchies: Poems 1952–2012, ed. Kenneth Haynes (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013): 557–601. The essential argument and vision of the collection—
my main concern—is the same in the different versions. (2) and (3) do not vary much: 
(3) shortens “On Reading Crowds and Power” to its first verse-paragraph, deleting the 
three other sections, and leaves out altogether “On Reading Burke on Empire, Liberty 
and Reform.” When I refer to the latter, I use the Penguin text.  
2 
 
going assimilation, is one element of what the volume as a whole is 
telling us. In a fallen world—and we will see how much Hill has to say 
about the Fall later—false communication rides easily on subtle and not 
so subtle lies, distortions, evasions, self-interests, and self-deceptions. 
The torque of a complex style, elision, sometimes contorted nuance and 
exactness, are ways of trying to take language back in the direction of an 
original honesty—which is not to say that there isn’t a lot of aesthetic joy, 
fun even, buried deep down. There is, we might say, a kind of negotiation 
between this austerity and this joy, so that occasionally an exquisite lyric 
fullness breaks out even though much of the time Hill is writing what he 
has called elsewhere “treatise-poems.”2 In a self-reflexive manner, within 
the volume, he speaks of writing “recitatives” rather than “arias,” of his 
desire to “unmake / all wrought finalities, become a babbler / in the 
crowd’s face,” or, as he expresses it in another poem, to write “spare 
strophes that yield almost nothing / to the knowledge /outside them raw 
with late wisdom.”3  As a philosophically learned poet, he is writing 
something like a treatise of politics and poetics which is prepared to live 
in the reader’s mind not as some wholesome affirmation, but in a self-
conscious brokenness, a symbolic enactment of the ever-recurring nature 
of human failure. His theological positions—putting a lot in a short 
space—are overwhelmingly orthodox, so that the self-emptying of God in 
                                                          
2 Geoffrey Hill, “Civil Polity and the Confessing State,” The Warwick Review 2, no. 2 
(2008): 15. 
3 These quotations are from “Citations II,” 1, 3, “Nachwort,” 7–9, and “A Précis or 
Memorandum of Civil Power,” 9–11. 
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Christ lies at the heart of his religious understandings.4 Moving forward 
into the aesthetic realm from these kinds of depth, we could say that 
what he is doing here is practising a deliberate ascesis of thought and 
word in relation to often tragic subject-matter.  
 
The Dilemma of History 
A Treatise’s vision will remind many of Benjamin’s image of the Angélus 
Novus looking back over the disaster of history—tyranny, war,  
repression, brutality, and dictatorship figure largely here—yet at the 
same time there are clear stirrings within this of Hill’s religious position. 
Gillian Rose, the philosopher and late convert to Christianity, mourned 
here in the elegy “In Memoriam: Gillian Rose,” is a clear influence on his 
perspective. Her work would provide a useful lens through which to 
grasp aspects of his religious position (though that is not my task here). 
One of Rowan Williams’s paraphrases of Rose’s views can take us quickly 
into the heart of the volume’s concerns: 
 
Talking about history is talking about the record or deposit of 
speech, in every possible sense, including very obviously the 
paradoxical speech of those silenced in history by the voices of 
others; the enterprise of reading history as intelligible, as 
generative of understanding and strategy now, is, it seems, the 
                                                          
4 See, for example, his “Poetics and the Kenotic Hymn,” an appendix in Lucien Richard, 
Christ: The Self-Emptying of God (New York: Paulist Press, 1997): 195–97. 
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unavoidable form of thinking about thinking, once we have 
understood that what we can say and think is empowered by what 
has been said and thought. This is ultimately to return us to 
Hegel’s fundamental insight: history is how we do our 
metaphysics, how we reflect on what we non-negotiably are and 
what are the conditions of our concept-formation. Not that history 
as record delivers to us a map of the constructions of the universe, 
or a comprehensive account of natural kinds or a compelling 
thesis about the nature of reference; but engagement with history 
lays bare for us the character of thinking as engagement, as 
converse, conflict, negotiation, judgement and self-judgement.5 
 
Hill—like Rose, and like Williams—emphasizes the vulnerability to error, 
self-deception, and failure of all our beliefs, projects, and actions within 
time, how they exist within a situation over which we do not have—could 
not have—complete control. Meaningful thought and action can only take 
place after we acknowledge, deeply, how we pre-exist within an always 
distorted situation, how our beliefs, and the actions resulting from them, 
involve the risk of error, that we may be misreading our situation, hence 
the situation of those who surround us—hence his wariness of any 
totalizing politics.  The gist here is to see the (inevitable) violence implicit 
or explicit within different kinds of situation and that, within the 
                                                          
5 Rowan Williams, “Between politics and metaphysics: reflections in the wake of Gillian 
Rose,” in Wrestling with Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology (London: SCM 
Press, 2007): 67. 
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conditions of time, there is no way of side-stepping this reality; we have 
to work within it, via self-critique, negotiation, and (if needs be) 
suffering.  
Six of the poems in the collection focus on the reign of Henry VIII and 
on the lives of  Thomas Wyatt, Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey, and Hans 
Holbein: these are “Holbein I,” “Holbein II,” “Parallel Lives I,” “Parallel 
Lives II,” “In Framlingham Church,” and “De Necessitate.” The broad 
reading of Henry’s reign these imply, particularly from the perspective of 
artists and poets, is that so well outlined in Greg Walker’s Writing under 
Tyranny: English Literature and the Henrician Reformation (though 
dates of publication preclude direct influence). Walker’s epigraph, from 
Maurice Latey’s Tyranny: A Study in the Abuse of Power, could equally 
well be set over these poems: “Tyranny is, so to speak, a nervous 
breakdown of the body politic.”6 Amid the intensifying fractiousness of 
the 1530s and 1540s, Hill considers what was it like to be Thomas Wyatt 
(the conveyor of the sonnet form into English) seeing his friend Thomas 
Cromwell beheaded; or Henry, Earl of Surrey (the inventor of blank 
verse), watching his ideals of honour travestied by the king’s policies, and 
himself eventually falling foul of royal paranoia; or the great portraitist, 
Hans Holbein, whose works appear so serene, painting in an atmosphere 
where it was perilously easy for former clients to lose their heads.   
                                                          
6 Greg Walker, Writing under Tyranny: English Literature and the Henrician 
Reformation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. v. 
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The unrhymed sonnet “Holbein II” celebrates the invention of blank 
verse by Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey, sometime in the early 1540s 
(probably 1543). The discovery of this verse-form, eventually one of the 
crucial modes of English poetry, took place during his attempt to 
translate the Aeneid into English. For Hill, following the best scholarship 
here, but also in some sense going beyond it, the invention of blank verse 
was not a purely aesthetic matter, a discovery in the artistic realm; in 
fact—this is part of the wider meaning of the volume—it is  the very idea 
of a “purely aesthetic matter” that is being contested. Surrey was 
resisting the moral and political framework within which he found 
himself by developing this dignified and flexible verse-form.  
The great study of Surrey, which Hill certainly knows, is W. A. 
Sessions’ Life, in particular chapter 10: 
 
The young earl’s language was intended specifically as discourse 
for a Tudor court, a language of nobility with the heightened 
conversation one might hear flowing at Surrey House, at Windsor, 
at Whitehall. It was written, then, at least on one level, with a 
specific political goal in mind, a renovatio of English blood 
nobility. . . . In the last decade of his life, the young earl had found 
a specifically English heroic line—deep within himself—for the 
objective representation of a history he did not fully understand 
but must encounter and confront. His line of ten unrhymed 
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syllables will inscribe a narrative of Virgilian destiny: uncontrolled 
eros before an equally uncontrolled thanatos, history’s constant 
tendency ‘ruere in peius’ (‘to sink into the worse’), in the phrase 
from the Georgics (I:200), which Curtius sees as crucial to any 
interpretation of Virgil. . . . Transferring the Roman epic into 
English would be one more way to bring order to the dislocation of 
his own time, another Roman role to control the ‘frencey in our 
commyn wele’, in Thomas Starkey’s phrase.7 
 
In “Holbein II” we have a modulated version of this thought: 
 
Imagine Hercules mated with the Hydra, 
this king of bloody trunks their monster child. 
More would have so rated him the arch 
cleaver of women and old holy men.  
Cerebral incest, his sperm a witch broth. 
And Surrey, with his hierarchy of verse. 
Meticulous the apportioning of time 
in its reserve, Virgilian rectitude, 
as though a full pavane of the elect 
                                                          
7 Henry Howard, the Poet Earl of Surrey: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 260, 262, 263–64. 
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were the ten syllables to which they trod 
as to the noblest music in the land, . . .  (1–11) 
 
We may at first be puzzled by “they” (10), but the context makes clear 
that it refers back to Thomas More in line 3, so that “they” is both Surrey 
and More, and by implication other resisters of the times. The pavane, “a 
grave and stately dance, in which the dancers were elaborately dressed” 
(OED), was indeed introduced into England from France during Henry’s 
reign. The grace of pause and movement in blank verse at its best—as in 
Surrey’s Aeneid—becomes an image for that sense of right hierarchy, 
timeliness, and “rectitude” embodied in the dance, all the qualities so 
lacking in the modes and manners of the exercise of civil power. The  
closing lines of this sonnet evoke the sparse, disciplined, but “lovely 
fecundity” (12) of the countryside around Framlingham, Suffolk, where 
Surrey is buried, as yet another parallel for the quietly understated but 
beautiful order of blank verse itself. 
In miniature here we have one element of the larger theme of the 
collection, a theme already dealt with extensively in Hill’s critical 
writings, particularly in The Enemy’s Country (1991). That work was at  
pains to demystify the canon of poetry and prose, to make clear that the 
endeavour of real literary art rarely takes place in some luxurious 
vacuum away from contingent pressures. One of its epigraphs is from 
Ezra Pound: “You cannot call a man an artist until he shows himself 
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capable of reticence and of restraint, until he shows himself in some 
degree master of the forces which beat upon him.”8 This seems to be 
echoed in “Holbein II” by “reserve, Virgilian rectitude” (8). For Hill an 
attribute of the true artist is that he or she is morally braced against the 
times, whilst also deeply aware of the perils of self-deception. Here he 
seeks to disrupt some glamorous or distant reading of “the Tudors” by 
the company in which he sets Surrey. For convenience of simplification, I 
pick out Edmund Burke, William Blake, Ernst Barlach, and Aleksander 
Wat.  
“On Reading Burke on Empire, Liberty, and Reform,”9 takes David 
Bromwich’s selection from Burke’s writings as an occasion for examining 
aspects of Burke’s stance towards the American war, and how that stance 
was bound up with his “cogent style” (16). For Hill, of course also, prose 
style is not some aesthetic add-on, indeed style/meaning is more even 
than a binary.  Involving manner, “technic,”  craftsmanship, style 
determines to a large extent what can possibly be said and perceived; it is 
a moral attribute. The phrases quoted in italics in this poem are from 
Burke’s great speech attempting to divert England from the American 
war, “Mr Burke’s Speech on Moving his Resolutions for Conciliation with 
the Colonies” (March 1775), which emerges out of a level of “culture” (22) 
lacking in the contemporary world. We are being asked to imagine a 
history that avoided the long brutalities of the American war, in which 
                                                          
8 Originally from Ezra Pound, Selected Prose 1909–1965 (New York: New Directions, 
1973), 114. 
9  See footnote 1. 
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America-England might still be a political unit. As far as Hill is 
concerned Burke was prophetic in his opposition to the war, and it is 
hard not to think that contemporary parallels are in play. 
The Burke poem leads us on to the poem about William Blake, “On 
Reading Blake: Prophet Against Empire,” a response to David V. 
Erdman’s seminal study, for it too has its starting-point in the American 
war. Most of the stanzas are simply following through, wittily, points 
made in Erdman’s book: that Blake’s early cynicism at the restoration of 
the political status quo after the disaster of the American war, as shown 
still active in the early skit An Island in the Moon (1784), was what 
converted into his spiritual notion of “innocence” (stanza 1); that Blake’s 
crypticism in his works was a response to his fear of Britain’s repressive 
government as it developed in the war years (stanza 2); that his painting 
The Spiritual Form of Nelson guiding Leviathan (1809)— which initially 
appears so heroic—is actually a subversive attack on Nelson as “heroic 
villain” and on the force of imperial power (stanza 3). Hill sympathizes 
with Blake in his long mental suffering during the years of the 
Napoleonic wars.  
This can move us on to two more images of artist-as-moral-resister in 
the twentieth century. “In Memoriam: Ernest Barlach” celebrates the 
great sculptor for the way he was in touch with the Low German, earthy 
culture of his part of Germany, and for his great Ehrenmal (cenotaph) 
and Mahnmal (memorial) to the dead of the First World War. Hill 
emphasizes that with regard to Barlach “Artist Against the Third Reich” 
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would be “something of a misnomer” (24–25), since, though he opposed 
the regime, his condemnation as a degenerate artist occurred mainly 
because of the way in which his profound, often tragic, images so 
completely failed to play to the new stridently positivist, nationalist 
agenda. “In Memoriam: Aleksander Wat” recalls the poet’s death-note to 
his wife, “Do nothing to revive me” (4), after he had finally, close to 
death anyway, taken an overdose of sleeping pills to ease himself out of 
the years of pain and ill health that he had suffered as a consequence of 
Stalin’s camps. Hill celebrates how Wat’s surrealism was a subtle 
reaching above and beyond all he had suffered and seen, all the prisons, 
hospitals, forced deportations, and confinements of different kinds that 
he endured during the years 1941–1944.   
Cumulatively, there is something terrible about bringing these and 
other instances of suffering together, a force of persuasion; other poems, 
for example, deal with the English Civil War, the German invasion of 
France in 1940, and the Warsaw Ghetto. In ranging across times we have 
something of the effect of the famous passage in Newman’s Apologia, 
chapter 5, where he maps out his reasons for believing in the Fall and 
original sin, a passage that has been a touchstone of Hill’s wider 
thinking: “To consider the world in its length and breadth, its various 
history, the many races of man, their starts, their fortunes, their mutual 
alienation, their conflicts…” And so it goes, on and on, culminating in 
this: 
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[to consider] the defeat of good, the success of evil, physical pain, 
mental anguish, the prevalence and intensity of sin, the pervading 
idolatries, the corruptions, the dreary hopeless irreligion …—all 
this is a vision to dizzy and appal; and inflicts upon the mind the 
sense of a profound mystery, which is absolutely beyond human 
solution.10 
 
The liberal or secularist critic has at least the duty to see where Hill is 
coming from, for as a poet he is surely marked out uniquely in our time 
by the profundity of his sense of original sin and its consequences. One 
danger here is simple confusion over this now less-than-familiar 
religious language. Since the poems above describe what they mean in 
this regard, perhaps the possibility of misunderstanding is reduced. Hill’s 
vision of things goes backwards and forwards in time, with a sense, again 
and again, that humankind is self-alienated from its best desires and 
ends; for him a progressivist or Whig-liberal ascending trajectory to 
history is impossible. His implicit warning is that the political order of 
liberal societies is far more fragile than we suppose.  
He is not making exact parallels—that is not the point. The tyranny of 
Henry VIII is not the same as Stalin’s; the concentration camp in Russia 
where Aleksander Wat was held is not the same as the Tower of London 
in which Wyatt and Surrey suffered. Nonetheless, these things are being 
                                                          
10 John Henry Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, ed. Martin J. Svaglic (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1967), 217. Hill often cites Newman’s characterization of the Fall as 
humankind’s “terrible aboriginal calamity,” a phrase occurring later in this passage. 
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made to resonate together. Times may be different, he implies, but often 
they are differently the same. It is the Fall that makes the quest for the 
true disposition of civil power such an endless and endlessly crucial 
concern, given history’s propensity “to sink into the worst.”   
 
 
Against False Optimism 
There is one relatively minor poem in the volume that is particularly 
important as a means to understand the volume’s larger argument: 
“After Reading Children of Albion (1969).”  We may not notice at first the 
date in the title, but it is there to point us to the 1960s’ high moment. The 
book referred to is Children of Albion: Poetry of the ‘Underground’ in 
Britain, edited by Michael Horovitz, an anthology of countercultural and 
protest poets, helping to forge, as they saw it, the new and better 
consciousness that would replace the world of late capitalism, with its 
wars, authoritarianism, and lack of love. In the anthology’s “Afterwords” 
Horovitz describes his own moment of “conversion” in 1960s’ Oxford, 
when he saw that “the mutual response between people determined to 
free their spirit can simultaneously give birth to the architecture of 
liberation.”11  There follows an account of the “International Poetry 
Incarnation” at the Albert Hall (June 1965), and of other poetry events 
“intermingling and loosening the perimeter divisions between poetry-
                                                          
11 Michael Horovitz, Children of Albion: Poetry of the ‘Underground’ in Britain 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 321. Further references are in the text. 
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jazz-blues-raga and modern classical music” (327). Poetry was released 
from the “dusty iambic grooves of book (society) culture” and the effects 
of “Eliot’s cerebral intonations,” and, “the margin between verse and 
song” being closed up, it became a living performance art once more: 
 
Fellow feeling between poets plants an Eden of new 
consciousness: in Blakean image, the lion (energy) slays the 
monster of mental operations & lies down with the lamb (spirit)—
to rise again, as one man—‘to smite the land with the rod of his 
mouth’; or nurture it with wells of song. (335) 
 
So, in Children of Albion itself, we have this kind of anti-war poetry: 
 
O come love these fearful warring armies 
& plant tulips deep inside their guns. 
 
Come ready armed with flowers, bibles, buddhas 
& protect each other with kindly thoughts. 
Seek out each aggressor to invite him to 
Smoke with you the magic weed of peace.  (56–57) 
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“After Reading Children of Albion (1969)” certainly constitutes a critique 
of all this, but, considering some of the excesses above, its tone is 
contained, muted even.  The volume, says Hill, constitutes a “Time-
expired accusation” (1). The Children of Albion—the poets of the volume 
and the new age—are no doubt now “old men and women / compromised 
by the deeds they signed in Eden / forsaking dearth” (4–6). I take it that 
the last words here are an echo of Paradise Lost, the tender words that 
Adam remembers God speaking to him: 
 
This Paradise I give thee, count it thine 
To Till and keep, and of the Fruit to eate: 
Of every Tree that in the Garden growes 
Eate freely with glad heart; fear here no dearth    
(8. 319–22) 
 
In the second strophe Hill contrasts Will Kemp’s Jig of 1599—the 
extraordinary “Nine Days’ Wonder” when Shakespeare’s fellow actor and 
morris-dance expert danced all the way from London to Norwich—with a 
modern ersatz hour-long re-enactment of the same, complete with the 
stage-effect of “a gold Albion uprearing” (12). The problem for the 1960s’ 
poets, as he sees it, is that they simply signed up to live in their false 
Eden forsaking the real “dearth” of the fallen world. In Gillian Rose’s 
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terms their proposal is “to abolish the ethical, the givenness of 
constraint, the already that grounds any present act of will,” which is 
essentially “an attempt to take us out of time.”12 The last strophe of the 
poem picks up a line from a particular poem in the anthology, from John 
James’s “Bathampton Morrismen at the Rose & Crown,” as another 
instance of protest occurring at too superficial a level, with insufficient 
self-knowledge and self-critique.  His stance is certainly no loose attack 
on the era of free love, pot, spontaneity, and psychedelic consciousness. 
It is grounded, again, in his sense of the recalcitrance of the world and of 
the human heart to easy possibilities of goodness. This vein of thinking 
can be seen operating in a number of poems in the collection.  
There are, for example, those poems where he draws attention to the 
toughness of aspects of his own working-class heritage. “Coda,” which 
anticipates the later collection Oraclau (2012), is about his great-
grandfather, Pryce Jukes (1826–1895), who moved from near Newtown, 
in central Wales, to the Black Country, in 1870, his trade of iron-puddling 
being both difficult and hazardous. Here Hill describes himself as “great 
grandson, and son, of defeated men, / in my childhood, that is” (34–35), 
and attributes his sometimes dark moods and turns of mind to aspects of 
this heritage. In “In Memoriam: Ernst Barlach” this background is at play 
again, when he compares Barlach’s Low German and Low German 
cultural background to the “low” Black Country dialect which surrounded 
him in his own youth. It is a moving and touching cross-over, and brings 
                                                          
12 Again, as paraphrased by Rowan Williams: 63. 
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alive to the reader unfamiliar with Barlach’s part of Germany something 
of its resonance. The most surprising poem in this vein is “On Reading 
The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall,” in other words Francis 
Bacon’s famous essays (1625). That work was a normal part of the canon 
of seventeenth-century literature with which Hill grew up: the essays are 
usually considered masterpieces of prose, and much praised for their 
aphoristic, clipped but judicious Senecan style. A standard kind of praise 
of them goes like this: 
 
The charm of Bacon’s writings lies in his “wit,” in the broad old 
sense of the word, in which it means intellect as well as 
expression. The sagacity of the underlying thought on which we 
rest when we apprehend the meaning of his words is as potent an 
element in our impression of delight as the aptness of the phrase 
and the ingenuity of the allusion. It is the style, as including both 
matter and manner, that is the man.13 
 
Hill is having none of this:  
 
So many had nothing; we have orchards 
sometimes ill-neighboured, and are driven 
                                                          
13 English Prose: Selections with Critical Introductions, ed. Henry Craik, vol. 2 (New 
York: Macmillan, 1916), 9–10. 
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to untimely harvest, simply to thwart thieves. (1–3) 
 
Suddenly, in the sending up of that intrusive “we,” Bacon is marked out 
as inhabiting the world of the upper echelons of Jacobean society, remote 
from the world of the poor. It is a context and mindset in which poverty 
“means chiefly / poverty of mind” (24-25). So often suspicious of the way 
lyricism in poetry can muffle, evade, or elide truth-telling, here Hill is 
wondering how the subtleties of Bacon’s rhetoric, delicate balance and 
antithesis so finely honed, may just be such another distancing of reality. 
Exaggerated class division persists: “So many had, and have, nothing” 
(42). His own parents “never owned a house”: “I . . . wish I could keep 
resentment / out of my voice” (49, 53-55). In very personal terms a 
supposed masterpiece of the canon is being challenged and set at a 
distance. 
A last poem on this theme, with again the 1960s somewhere at the 
heart of it, is “On Looking Through 50 Jahre im Bild: Bundesrepublick 
Deutschland I [i.e. 50 Years in Pictures: Federal Republic of Germany].” 
There is nothing particularly difficult or complex here, the poem being, 
from one point of view, a straightforward account of looking through a 
coffee table book of photographs charting the fifty years of the post-war 
reconstruction. Yet at its heart are these lines about 1960s’ radical 
politics and the conservative responses to it: 
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The riots and demonstrations that now appear 
like interludes, masques, or pageants, or students’ rags; 
the police water-cannon: you look for the film’s director 
but cannot find him.     (6–9) 
 
The accumulation “like interludes, masques, or pageants, or students’ 
rags” almost tips into satire, the implicit criticism and distancing being 
pressed on us. The poem ends, where Hill so often ends, with thoughts of 
the Holocaust, and the image of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt 
kneeling spontaneously at the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial, in a silent 
gesture of repentance and apology. This was in 1970, and Hill gives the 
date in the poem as a kind of rebuke to the 1960s’ high-jinks he describes 
above. Deep aspects of his partly generational response to 1960s’ 
radicalism are here in play. 
So far, rather ruthlessly perhaps, we have seen a poet who believes, 
emphatically, in the Fall and original sin—humankind’s radical 
disorientation—and who evinces, quite directly, a fair amount of 
scepticism about our ability to work against this condition of blindness. 
For Hill, we exist in a real, absolute double-bind: we know the world is 
wrong and wrongly constituted, that our politics and political 
organization are bad, and that we have the capacity, so easily, to head 
seriously into darkness (war, dictatorship, etc.). Equally clearly, we can 
envisage, we desire, a better world, “the realm of primal justice and 
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accord” (128), as “A Précis or Memorandum of Civil Power” so 
beautifully expresses it. What does this aspiration mean? Does it always 
have to be frustrated?   
It is perhaps surprising that the way out of this dilemma, from an 
orthodox Christian viewpoint—the redemptive death and resurrection of 
Christ—is not something Hill speaks about directly. We might say that it 
is a hidden or implied centre, the gracious x that releases humankind 
from the fatal stasis outlined above. The volume’s title,  A Treatise of 
Civil Power, directs us to its focus on politics and history, the issues of 
social organization, authority, and justice, and—as we have seen—the 
role of art and artist within these things. I suspect that directly religious 
verse seemed out of place in this context.   
On the other hand, in this same context, some of the things seen so far 
must be turned upside down. There is a frisson, for Hill, in looking at the 
worst for, somehow and mysteriously, the worst may imply its opposite. 
Henry, Earl of Surrey, William Blake, Aleksander Wat, Ernest Barlach all 
suffered in their times under different kinds of repression and tyranny, 
but they were all moral resisters: their examples point to the fact that this 
is not the real or appropriate state of human affairs. Post-war Germany 
may often have evaded the full force of the meaning of the Holocaust 
legacy, rejoicing in its “Economic Miracle,” indulging a kind of make-
believe politics, but the gesture of Willy Brandt, actually kneeling 
spontaneously at the Ghetto memorial, shows there are ways in which we 
can get near to what is true or adequate, ways in which we can speak a 
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kind of language—or silence—that is a precondition for genuine political 
transformation.  In hinting at the totality of buried and hidden good that 
is already active in the world, that can be recouped by human beings 
against the odds, Hill writes three poems focused on particular musical 
compositions. In complex and implicit ways, music is being used as an 
analogy for the quest for justice and peace in more material terms. 
 
The Quest for True Harmony 
To speak of the “political” role of music is clearly to enter a complex  
space. What are the viable or meaningful connections here? The question 
becomes all the more pressing, I think, once we realize that in speaking 
of “music” Hill is in part speaking of his own art of poetry. What is the 
real political role of art, if it is to be something truer, for example, than 
the poetry of the “children of Albion”? In one of his more fragmentary 
essays, Hill has been open about the dilemmas of trying to answer this 
question: “I have affirmed my belief that ‘poetry is inextricably bound 
into the purpose and function of civil polity’. I have also conceded my 
incapacity to suggest how any real ‘purchase’ (a Burkean word) of poetry 
on polity might be achieved.”14 Neither does A Treatise supply any 
simple or downright answer. I suggest, however, that it does give an 
implied answer, which is worth heeding.  
                                                          
14 “Civil Polity and the Confessing State”: 10. 
22 
 
Hill takes for granted—or perhaps hopes to take for granted—readers’ 
own experience of being profoundly moved by music and hence (as he 
would see it) of being opened up to the existential depths in which 
religious mystery can touch us. In A Treatise, in simple terms, music 
becomes a way of talking about our aspiration towards harmony and 
peace, the fundamental need for a pattern and shape in which all discord 
can be resolved or at least better managed or held within appropriate 
limits. Musical beauty is built up of its own internal resolutions of 
harmony and dissonance within a pattern of some kind of aesthetic 
image of order: to say this much is already to hint at how it might be said 
to image the good political state. Music’s high beauty is for Hill an 
enacting of our aspiration towards the transcendentally other, a pointer 
to that unseen beauty from which the earthly order desperately needs to 
take its cue. 
The first of the music poems is the most modest, for it deals essentially 
with harmony and dissonance within the individual life. “Johannes 
Brahms, Opus 2” evokes the second piano sonata in  F-sharp minor, its 
hard fortissimo passages set sharply against passages of great 
tenderness. “Do not compound arrival with destiny / though here you 
could act so and be right”  (8–9): in the individual life, lived with its 
highs and lows, its difficulties and elations, its sin and its goodness, we 
cannot see how “discord in harmony” (3) will be able to make some kind 
of sense in the end; the work of music is perhaps, by contrast with the 
moral realm, a kind of sleight of hand, where melodies, harmonies, and 
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dissonances come to their proper end, and, in the case of Brahms, are 
bound to end in a resolution that makes sense of what has gone before. 
The danger for the individual life, of course, is that this might not 
happen. The poem’s second half is more optimistic, or perhaps just more 
brusque: in the end, as the piece of music ends, so we too come to death, 
“the body of our endurance / over and done with” (6–7), and, whether we 
are religiously minded or not, there then is the pattern of our life shaped 
in time.  
The next music poem is a little wider in its concerns. In the baldly 
named “G. F. Handel, Opus 6” we are being directed towards the 
Concerti Grossi or Twelve Grand Concertos (pub. 1739), primarily 
beautiful, controlled, but often very buoyant music for strings. Here the 
music provides a metaphor for good political organization and, further, 
and relatedly, a metaphor for the harmony of the poet’s own marriage. 
The opening lines are a direct pointer to an intertextual link: 
“Monumentality and bidding: words / neither yours nor mine, but like 
his music” (1–2). The reference is to Hopkins’s letters, via his own essay 
“Alienated Majesty: Gerard M. Hopkins”: 
 
In principle again, such a combination [of the ‘robustious’ and the 
‘very highly wrought’] could, in Hopkins’s case, relate closely to 
one of his sharpest creative realizations: the relation of 
‘monumentality’ to ‘bidding’. ‘Bidding’ is Hopkins’s term for ‘the 
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art or virtue of saying everything right to or at the hearer . . . and 
of discarding everything that does not bid, does not tell’. Hopkins 
goes on to make one of his most penetrating observations: ‘It is 
most difficult to combine this bidding, such a fugitive thing, with a 
monumental style’. It is the key to what is right and wrong in his 
own poetic method; to what is strong and weak in Keats’s poems 
of 1819–20 (‘To Autumn’, the unfinished ‘Hyperion’); and to what, 
in Wordsworth or Tennyson, strikes us as noble simplicity rather 
than mere verbosity or canting. . . . The genius of Hopkins’s own 
late poetry—‘That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the comfort 
of the Resurrection’, ‘Thou art indeed just, Lord . . .’—is itself a 
structural compounding of bidding with monumentality: ‘Mine, O 
thou lord of life, send my roots rain’.15 
 
In Handel’s music there is a balance between “monumentality” and 
“bidding,” between strength and the grace that tells, which come together 
in an image of that ideal interacting of “power” and “civility” (11) that 
would make up the ideally functioning state. This is then an image of the 
way in which eros and philia (friendship) make up the “composure” (16) 
of the poet’s own relationship, its harmony being in its own way an image 
of the larger harmony that might, ideally, exist between all citizens in 
their relations with each other.  
                                                          
15 Geoffrey Hill, Collected Critical Writings, ed. Kenneth Haynes (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 529. 
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The last music poem, or at least the last poem with music at its centre, 
though it is even more ranging in its concerns, is “A Précis or 
Memorandum of Civil Power.” This is probably the finest poem in the 
volume, and certainly the most reaching in its ambition. I do not want to 
provide a line-by-line paraphrase, complex as  it is, but rather to seek out 
a few crucial or essential elements of its meaning. “A Précis . . .” has 
seven sections, the six days of creation and the day of rest being a 
number of harmony and hence a part of the quest for “the realm of 
primal justice and accord” (128). The poem begins and ends with 
thoughts about Olivier Messiaen’s Quatour pour la Fin du Temps, the 
modernist quartet, for violin, clarinet, cello, and piano, composed while 
Messiaen was being held as a prisoner-of-war in a German prison camp 
after the defeat of France in 1940. Looking back over the subject-matter 
outlined above, it should be apparent how, in this one poem, Hill brings 
together the main concerns of the collection. Quatour pour la Fin du 
Temps was first performed in the prison camp by Messiaen and fellow 
prisoners, in January 1941, one of the masterpieces of twentieth-century 
music having its première—the word seems ludicrous in the context—in 
the appalling cold and privation of Stalag VIII-A. The event brings 
together the highs and lows of the twentieth century, the highs and lows 
of the human condition.  
Appropriate to the French subject-matter, Hill starts the poem with a 
thought from “G. Marcel” (5), i.e. Gabriel Marcel (1889–1973), the 
French existentialist philosopher. Though Hill alludes to this passage 
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from Être et avoir in a thoroughly truncated form (4–5), it is the bed-
rock of the poem’s thought, hence worth giving in full: 
 
In turning my attention to what one usually thinks of as 
ontological problems, such as Does Being exist? What is Being? 
etc., I came to observe that I cannot think about these problems 
without seeing a new gulf open beneath by feet, namely, This I, I 
who ask questions about being, can I be sure that I exist? What 
qualifications have I for pursuing these inquiries? . . . In spite of 
the thought which comes first into my head, I do not think that 
Descartes’ cogito can be of any help to us here. The cogito, as I 
have written elsewhere, is at the mere threshold of validity; the 
subject of the cogito is the epistemological subject. Cartesianism 
implies a severance, which may be fatal anyhow, between intellect 
and life; its result is a depreciation of the one, and an exaltation of 
the other, both arbitrary. There is here an inevitable rhythm only 
too familiar to us, for which we are bound to find an explanation. 
It would certainly not be proper to deny the legitimacy of making 
distinctions of order within the unity of a living subject, who 
thinks and strives to think of himself. But the ontological problem 
can only arise beyond such distinctions, and for the living being 
grasped in his full unity and variety.16 
                                                          
16 Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having, trans. Katherine Farrer (Westminster: Dacre 
Press, 1949), 170–71. 
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For Hill nothing less than a sense of the mystery of Being, going far 
beyond the empirical, far beyond materialistic explanations, can account 
for the austere beauty of Messiaen’s music composed in such times and 
under such conditions. From herein the argument of the rest of poem is 
not so hard to seek.  
In section II, Hill thinks of the very young poet, John Cornford (1915–
1936), a passionate communist, killed fighting in the Spanish Civil War, 
and of his fine poem “Heart of the Heartless World.”  The thought here is 
that Cornford was a genuinely impressive figure, and a potentially fine 
poet, but, from Hill’s political viewpoint, he was getting things wrong. 
This is not some quick or trivial critique, along the lines of “a Communist 
is always wrong.” In terms of moral action and choice all of us have to 
take a stance, and in so doing risk our own imperception and failure. The 
conditions within which we exist makes it hard to get things right. 
Section IV rehearses a version of this same thought: our own individual 
actions do “make history; it’s not some / abysmal power” (69–70), and in 
that sense human order, because not instinctively graceful and strong 
like nature, is so much harder to get to work properly. Section V is a 
direct attack on the mendacities and inadequacies of the present 
functioning of the state in Britain. Section VII comes round again to the 
thought of Messiaen’s quartet, now set explicitly in the context of 
France’s “Strange Defeat” (135) in 1940, the reasons for this, and the 
“sick decorum of betrayal” (140) of the Vichy regime.  
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Now Hill asks the question that may seem meaningless or hard of 
answer, the question that he assumes has occurred to the reader: 
 
Why Quatuor pour la Fin du Temps, this has  
nothing to do 
surely with civil power?   (129–31)   
 
Surely, in the end, the aesthetic realm has nothing to do with the political 
organization and right disposition of the state, with politics in its most 
fundamental sense? What can Messiaen’s art, and implicitly Hill’s own 
art, have to do with the quest for true social and political organization, 
the kind that gives us justice and peace? There are two answers here, I 
suggest, though neither is going to be satisfactory to many readers.  
One answer is given in quite bare and perhaps overly abbreviated 
terms in section VII itself. Messiaen’s music, based on Revelations 
chapter 10, “strikes chords / direct and angular” (131–2)  because it 
speaks of Eternity, of God’s love beyond time, and so passes a kind of 
judgement on the 1930s’ moral malaise of France which made it so 
vulnerable to German attack and on the deplorable circumstances of its 
own composition. It strikes up “irregular beauties contra the New Order” 
(147). “Irregular,” in the context of Nazism, is weighted: the modernist 
element in Messiaen’s treatment of tempo and harmony becomes a form 
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of resistance in itself. “New Order” clearly means Nazism, but also the 
condition of existential Disorder generally.  
A second answer, I suggest, comes via the poem’s larger force-field, 
and indeed the whole volume. The practice of this kind of art embodies, 
makes audible as it were, a way of being whose spiritual resonances enact 
that human integrity which would solve all problems, which would lead 
us, individually and collectively—if all of us were so true to our best 
selves—to the “realm of primal justice and accord.” There are other 
poems in the volume, which cannot be covered here, which point in this 
same direction: “Integer Vitae,” for example, or “In Memoriam: Gillian 
Rose.” The artist is not directly a saint—such a proposition would be 
absurd to Hill—but the vocation of art, if practised wholly and truly, is a 
means by which the integrity of the artist’s practice manifested in real art 
becomes a symbol of truer ways of being. Here Hill’s affinities within the 
English poetic tradition are writ large. His forebears are Herbert, 
Vaughan, Blake, and Hopkins, very different poets from one point of 
view, but all poets for whom their own religious lives and commitments 
were inseparable from the practice and meaning of their art. This is 
ultimately why, in A Treatise of Civil Power, Olivier Messiaen is the 
high-point of its symbolic pattern. Every Sunday in Stalag VIII-A, 
Messiaen, devout Catholic, secluded himself in prayer. The rest of the 
time, under privileges from the cultured German prison commandant, he 
composed his extraordinary music. 
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